The Melitz-Chaney Model

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Motivation

- ▶ In the Krugman model, all firms have the same productivity, and all firms export.
- But, in reality, only a small fraction of firms export, and exporting firms are larger and more productive.
 - Large employment (the number of employees or total work hours),
 - Large sales,
 - High value-added per worker.
 - See, for example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), p.125.
- ► Therefore, we introduce firm heterogeneity.
 - So that only productive firms export in the model.



- In the following, we discuss a simple version of the Melitz-Chaney model following Allen and Arkolakis's lecture notes.
- ▶ The set of countries is *S*.
- ► Each country i ∈ S is populated by an exogenous measure L_i of workers/consumers.
- Each worker supplies a unit of labor inelastically.
- Labor is the only factor of production.

Varieties and firms (1)

- Each firm produces a different variety.
- The set of varieties produced in country *i* is denoted by Ω_i .
 - Ω_i is an endogenous object.
- The set of varieties produced in the world is $\Omega = \bigcup_{i \in S} \Omega_i$.
 - But, in equilibrium, a subset of Ω is not consumed by consumers in a country if the subset is not exported to the country.
- There is a mass M_i of firms in country *i*.
- Firms in country *i* must incur a fixed cost f_{ij} to export to destination *j*.

Varieties and firms (2)

- Firms are heterogeneous.
- Each firm in country *i* draws productivity φ from a cumulative distribution function $G_i(\varphi)$.
 - lt costs a productivity- φ firm $1/\varphi$ units of labor to produce one unit of its variety.
 - \blacktriangleright Henceforth, we say "firm φ " because firms that have the same productivity behave in the same way.
- All firms are subject to iceberg trade costs $\{\tau_{ij}\}_{i,j\in S}$.

Preferences and budget constraints

The utility of consumers in j is

$$U_j = \left(\sum_{i\in S}\int_{\Omega_{ij}}(q_{ij}(\omega))^{rac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}d\omega
ight)^{rac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

• Ω_{ij} : the set of varieties produced in *i* and available in *j*.

- $q_{ij}(\omega)$: the demand of variety ω shipped from *i* to *j*.
- σ : the elasticity of substitution.
- ► The budget constraint is

$$\sum_{i\in S}\int_{\Omega_{ij}}p_{ij}(\omega)q_{ij}(\omega)d\omega=Y_j.$$

p_{ij}(ω): the price of *ω* from *j* that consumers in *i* face.
 Y_i: the total expenditure in *j*.

Optimal demand

• The demand for ω produced in *i* by consumers in *j* is

$$q_{ij}(\omega) = \left(rac{p_{ij}(\omega)}{P_j}
ight)^{-\sigma} rac{Y_j}{P_j}$$

where

$$P_j = \left(\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S}}\int_{\Omega_{ij}}p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma}d\omega
ight)^{rac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$

 \blacktriangleright The amount spend on variety ω is

$$x_{ij}(\omega) = p_{ij}(\omega)q_{ij}(\omega) = p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma-1}.$$

 \blacktriangleright Integrating this across all varieties, the aggregate trade value from *i* to *j* is

$$X_{ij} = \int_{\Omega_{ij}} x_{ij}(\omega) d\omega = Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \int_{\Omega_{ij}} p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega.$$
(1)

Optimal prices

Firm φ in i sets the optimal prices (across various destinations) to maximize its profits

$$\max_{\{p_{ij}(\varphi)\}_{j\in S}}\sum_{j\in S}\left(p_{ij}(\varphi)q_{ij}(\varphi)-\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}q_{ij}(\varphi)-f_{ij}\right)$$

such that

$$q_{ij}(\varphi) = p_{ij}(\varphi)^{-\sigma} Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}.$$

Substituting the demand functions into the maximand yields

$$\max_{\{p_{ij}(\varphi)\}_{j\in S}}\sum_{j\in S}\left(p_{ij}(\varphi)^{1-\sigma}Y_{j}P_{j}^{\sigma-1}-\frac{w_{i}}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}p_{ij}(\varphi)^{-\sigma}Y_{j}P_{j}^{\sigma-1}-f_{ij}\right).$$

The first-order consition characterizes the optimal price that firm φ from *i* sets in *j*

$$p_{ij}(arphi) = rac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}rac{w_i}{arphi} au_{ij}.$$

Trade values and operating profits

Firm φ 's trade value from *i* to *j* conditional on it serving *j* is

$$x_{ij}(\varphi) = p_{ij}(\varphi)q_{ij}(\varphi) = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)^{1-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma-1}.$$
 (2)

• The operating profits that firm φ from *i* earning in *j* is

$$\pi_{ij}(\varphi) = \left(p_{ij}(\varphi) - \frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)q_{ij}(\varphi)$$

$$= \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij} - \frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)^{-\sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma - 1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma}\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}\right)^{1 - \sigma}\left(\frac{w_i}{\varphi}\tau_{ij}\right)^{1 - \sigma}Y_jP_j^{\sigma - 1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma}x_{ij}(\varphi).$$
(3)

Price indices and trade values

- Let h_{ij}(φ) be the probability density function of productivity of firms from country i that sells to j.
- Then we have

$$\int_{\Omega_{ij}} p_{ij}(\varphi)^{1-\sigma} d\omega$$

= $\int_{0}^{\infty} M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w_{i}}{\varphi} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} h_{ij}(\varphi) d\varphi$ (4)
= $M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} (\tilde{\varphi}_{ij})^{\sigma-1},$

where $\tilde{\varphi}_{ij} = \left(\int_0^\infty \varphi^{\sigma-1} h_{ij}(\varphi) d\varphi\right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}$ is what Melitz called the "average" productivity of firms that sell from *i* to *j*.

▶ Then we can rewrite the aggregate trade flow, (1), as

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} w_{1-\sigma} M_{ij} (\tilde{\varphi}_{ij})^{\sigma-1} Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}.$$

Selection into exporting and cutoff productivity

Firm φ in country i exports to j if and only if its operating profits exceeds the fixed cost to export there

 $\pi_{ij}(\varphi) \geq f_{ij}.$

Using (2) and (3), we rewrite this condition as

$$\frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w_i}{\varphi} \tau_{ij} \right)^{1 - \sigma} Y_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} \ge f_{ij}.$$

That is, productivity φ exceeds the cutoff productivity φ_{ii}^{*}

$$\varphi \ge \varphi_{ij}^* = \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij}(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}w_i\tau_{ij})^{\sigma-1}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}.$$
(5)

What's *h_{ij}*?

Cutoffs pin down masses of exporters

▶ The "average" productivity of firms selling from *i* to *j* is

$$ilde{arphi}_{ij} = \left(rac{1}{1-{\it G}_i(arphi_{ij}^*)}\int_{arphi_{ij}^*}^\infty arphi^{\sigma-1} d{\it G}_i(arphi)
ight)^{rac{1}{\sigma-1}}$$

The mass of firms selling from i to j is

$$M_{ij} = (1 - G_i(\varphi_{ij}^*))M_i$$

The aggregate trade value from i to j is

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} w_i^{1-\sigma} M_i \left(\int_{\varphi_{ij}^*}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dG_i(\varphi)\right) Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}.$$
 (6)

.


The Pareto distribution (Chaney)

- So far we have not specified $G_i(\cdot)$.
- For simplicity, suppose that productivity φ is no less than 1 in any country $\varphi \in [1, \infty)$.
- Assume that productivity of firms in *i* follows the Pareto distribution with shape parameter θ_i

$$G_i(\varphi) = 1 - \varphi^{-\theta_i}.$$
 (7)

• Assume $\theta_i > \sigma - 1$ so that trade flows are finite.

Examples of the Pareto distribution



See pareto.jl for the code to produce this figure.

The Pareto distributed productivity leads to the gravity equation (1)

A part of the average productivity is

$$\int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} dG_{i}(\varphi) = \int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} \left(\frac{d(1-\varphi^{-\theta_{i}})}{d\varphi} \right) d\varphi$$

$$= \theta_{i} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-\theta_{i}-2} d\varphi$$

$$= \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i}+1-\sigma} (\varphi_{ij}^{*})^{\sigma-\theta_{i}-1}$$

$$= \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i}+1-\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} (\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_{i} \tau_{ij})^{\sigma-1}}{Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma-1}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_{i}-1}{\sigma-1}},$$
(8)

where the last equality follows from the cutoff (5).

The Pareto distributed productivity leads to the gravity equation (2)

▶ (6) and (8) yield

$$\begin{aligned} X_{ij} &= \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} w_i^{1-\sigma} M_i \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i+1+\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_i \tau_{ij}\right)^{\sigma-1}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_i-1}{\sigma-1}}\right) Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \\ &= C_{1,i} (\tau_{ij} w_i)^{-\theta_i} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_i-1}{\sigma-1}} M_i (Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1})^{\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma-1}}, \end{aligned}$$

$$(9)$$

where
$$C_{1,i} = \sigma^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_i-1}{\sigma-1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\right)^{-\theta_i} \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i+1-\sigma}\right)$$
.

Free entry (1)

- Firms have to incur an entry cost f_i^e before they learn their productivity.
- ▶ The free entry condition is that the expected profits are equal to the entry cost

$$f_i^e = E_{\varphi}\left[\sum_{j\in S} \max\{\pi_{ij}(\varphi) - f_{ij}, 0\}
ight].$$

Then we can rewrite the equation above as

$$f_{i}^{e} = \int_{1}^{\infty} \sum_{j \in S} \max\{\pi_{ij}(\varphi) - f_{ij}, 0\} dG_{i}(\varphi)$$

$$= \sum_{j \in S} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^{*}}^{\infty} (\pi_{ij}(\varphi) - f_{ij}) dG_{i}(\varphi).$$
 (10)

Free entry (2)

▶ With the Pareto distribution (7), we can rewrite (10) as

$$f_i^e = \sum_{j \in S} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_i} \sigma^{-\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_i - 1}{\sigma - 1}} Y_j^{\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} P_j^{\theta_i}.$$

Country i's only source of income is wages, so we have

$$Y_j = w_j L_j. \tag{11}$$

► Therefore we have

$$f_i^e = \sum_{j \in S} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_i} \sigma^{-\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma - \theta_i - 1}{\sigma - 1}} (w_j L_j)^{\frac{\theta_i}{\sigma - 1}} P_j^{\theta_i}.$$
(12)

Rewriting price indices (1)

The average productivity is

 $\tilde{\varphi}$

$$\begin{split} \overset{\sigma^{-1}}{ij} &= \frac{1}{1 - G_i(\varphi_{ij}^*)} \int_{\varphi_{ij}^*}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma^{-1}} dG_i(\varphi) \\ &= \frac{1}{(\varphi_{ij}^*)^{-\theta_i}} \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} (\varphi_{ij}^*)^{\sigma^{-\theta_i - 1}} \\ &= \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \frac{\sigma f_{ij} (\frac{\sigma}{\sigma^{-1}} w_i \tau_{ij})^{\sigma^{-1}}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma^{-1}}}. \end{split}$$
(13)

▶ (4) and (13) yield

$$P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{i \in S} M_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_i \tau_{ij} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i + 1 - \sigma} \frac{\sigma f_{ij} (\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} w_i \tau_{ij})^{\sigma-1}}{Y_j P_j^{\sigma-1}}.$$

Rewriting price indices (2)

► The last equation is rewritten as

$$Y_{j} = \sum_{i \in S} M_{ij} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (1 - G(\varphi_{ij}^{*})) M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (\varphi_{ij}^{*})^{-\theta_{i}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} \left(\frac{\sigma f_{ij} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{\sigma - 1}}{Y_{j} P_{j}^{\sigma - 1}} \right)^{-\theta_{j}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}$$

$$= \sum_{i \in S} (\sigma f_{ij})^{-\frac{\theta_{j}}{\sigma - 1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i} \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta_{j}} Y_{j}^{\frac{\theta_{j}}{\sigma - 1}} P_{j}^{\theta_{j}} M_{i} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} \sigma f_{ij}.$$
(14)

Rewriting price indices (3)

• Solving (14) for
$$P_j^{-\theta_j}$$
, we have

$$P_{j}^{-\theta_{j}} = \sum_{i \in S} \frac{\theta_{i}}{\theta_{i} + 1 - \sigma} M_{i}(\sigma f_{ij})^{\frac{-\theta_{j} + \sigma - 1}{\sigma - 1}} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} w_{i}\tau_{ij}\right)^{-\theta_{j}} (w_{j}L_{j})^{\frac{\theta_{j} - \sigma + 1}{\sigma - 1}}.$$
 (15)

Trade balance

Assume that the income is equal to the expenditure (trade balance)

$$Y_j = \sum_{i \in S} X_{ij}.$$

▶ This, (9), and (11) yield

$$w_{j}L_{j} = \sum_{i \in S} C_{1,i}(\tau_{ij}w_{i})^{-\theta_{i}} f_{ij}^{\frac{\sigma-\theta_{i}-1}{\sigma-1}} M_{i}(w_{j}L_{j}P_{j}^{\sigma-1})^{\frac{\theta_{i}}{\sigma-1}}.$$
 (16)

Equilibrium system

- Now we end up with a system of 3N equations (12), (15), (16) with 3N unknowns $\{w_i\}_{i \in S}$, $\{M_i\}_{i \in S}$, and $\{P_i\}_{i \in S}$.
- ► This characterizes an equilibrium.